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This is a conceptual thesis about how both learning in relation to professional practice, 
particularly learning from practice, and the production and use of professional 
knowledge, can be understood. The work of the thesis is an attempt to address the issue 
of how to conceptualise an onto-epistemological framework for inquiry in the field of 
social sciences that consists of learning, practice, learning from practice and producing 
and using knowledge; a framework that fits more productively with practitioners’ 
experience in these areas than the one we currently use.  
The traditional ontological perspective, that frames the way in which concepts such as 
practice and learning are conceptualised, imposes significant limitations on their 
understanding and use. This traditional framework is substantialist in form. That is, it 
reflects a model of the world in which substances or entities have prime ontological 
significance. Because of this, the relations between entities are commonly either treated 
themselves reductively as additional entities, or are ignored. I argue that it is this 
relational reductionism of the traditional substantialist ontology that is problematic 
when considering human processes such as practice and learning.  
The thesis has its experiential origins in the lack of fit between espoused theories of 
learning and theories-in-use as related to professional practice. To illustrate this I use 
the claims of Evidence-based Medicine to function as a theory of medical practice and 
as a medical epistemology. I argue that its limitations in both areas follow from its 
development within the traditional substantialist, or entity-based, framework which 
shapes these claims. The limitations of Evidence-based Medicine serve as an example 
of the way in which applying relationally reductive manoeuvres to the complex relations 
of lived experience, while to some degree a necessary aspect of all human social 
functioning, is problematic if not done in a critical or reflective manner.  
The body of constructs and theories known as ‘complexity’ offers a more encompassing 
onto-epistemological framework for considering human processes. It does so because it 
is relation-based. In such a framework, systems and processes are conceptualised as 
being constituted by their relations, rather than built up of their composite entities. In  
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this thesis I draw on several already current theories and bodies of concepts which are 
consistent with a complexity perspective, to support the use of complexity as a 
framework in re-formulating learning and its relation to practice. 
The first of these is the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey’s formulation of living 
functionality which has ‘trans-actional’ relations as a central feature. I argue that if these 
relations are understood as an exemplar of complex living relations, then complexity 
has a capacity to account for the generativity (the emergence of the radically new) and 
the indeterminacy (the unknown unknowns) of human functioning, neither of which can 
be done within the traditional substantialist framework.  
The second is a body of concepts derived from psychoanalytic thinking and other 
theories of psycho-biological functioning which relate to human affective functioning. 
Human affective needs act as a driver of social processes and activities and human 
experience that is affectively shared between individuals and socially processed. 
produces meaning. What these concepts have in common is an understanding of human 
psycho-social function as having a relational basis at multiple levels, for which trans-
actional relating can function as a model. These psycho-biological concepts, with 
sociologist Niklas Luhmann’s theories of social functioning as emerging from inter-
personal communication, allow for distinctions to be made between aspects of human 
functioning at biological, psychological and social ‘levels’, levels that are both 
differentiated and mutually dependent, allowing a re-formulation of learning, its relation 
to practice and the production of knowledge.  
With these theories in mind, I take the ‘co-present group’ as central to an exploration of 
how practice and learning might look from a complexity perspective. The human co-
present group is a group, such as a work group, where individuals are each known to the 
others as specific individuals. It functions as a complex system (the group) of complex 
systems (the participating individuals). I argue that the co-present group functions as the 
site of both human learning and of the origin, development and modification of all 
social and cultural phenomena, both of which depend on the group processing of human 
affective states.  
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Because humans have the capacity to ‘share’ the processing of affective states with 
other specific individuals, this processing function is not co-terminous with the 
biological human individual but can be considered as an aspect of co-present group’s 
functionality. Learning, for the individual, emerges from co-present group processes 
through the bio-psychological individual. In contrast, and following the work of 
sociologist Niklas Luhmann, ‘communications’ emerge from complexity-reducing 
interactions between individuals, thus having a social origin, and are available for 
elaboration into social and cultural phenomena through repeated use and re-use in 
multiple contexts.  
I draw conclusions to this thesis in two areas. The first is that if complexity is 
understood broadly as being based on complex living relations as exemplified by John 
Dewey’s trans-actions, it can function as an onto-epistemological framework for inquiry 
into living human processes. The second area, which follows as a consequence of using 
such a framework, is that human processes are re-conceptualised in functional terms and 
can be seen as being based in, and emergent from, co-present group function. This, in 
turn, has consequences for how we understand learning, its relation to practice and the 
production and use of knowledge. 
 
